



The UGent Institutional Repository is the electronic archiving and dissemination platform for all 
UGent research publications. Ghent University has implemented a mandate stipulating that all 
academic publications of UGent researchers should be deposited and archived in this repository. 
Except for items where current copyright restrictions apply, these papers are available in Open 
Access. 
 
This item is the archived peer-reviewed author-version of: 
Title     Sound Ideas and Absurd Consequences: Reflections of a Legal Historian 
Authors   Raoul van Caenegem 
In: Journal, Volume (Issue), pages,  year.    
 European Review 01 February 2011 19 : pp 93-104  
 Copyright © Academia Europaea 2011 







European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 93–104 r 2011 Academia Europæa
doi:10.1017/S1062798710000384
Sound Ideas and Absurd
Consequences: Reﬂections of a Legal
Historian
R . C . VAN CA EN EG EM
Universiteitstraat 4, B 9000 Gent, Belgium. E-mail: karin.pensaert@ugent.be
During the 60 years that I have been writing – and speculating – on public law
(my ﬁrst book on medieval criminal law came out in 1954), I have been
repeatedly struck by a particular phenomenon to which I would now like to
draw attention: that sound ideas and useful innovations eventually – when
relentlessly taken to their extreme consequences and pushed along the abstract
lines of their inner logic – lead to absurd or even nefarious results, defeating the
original intention.
1. Dictatorship
The sophisticated and law-based Roman republic resorted in extreme circum-
stances to the appointment of a dictator: when the state was in danger, the
ordinary constitutional safeguards were set aside and the fate of the land put in
the hands of a saviour and supreme ruler, acting within the fundamental law of
the republic. The Roman dictator took complete control, even by-passing the
consuls, but his term of ofﬁce was limited to a maximum of six months. In legal
terms he was a magistrate of the republic and not an autocrat. The most famous
name in this gallery was Fabius Cunctator who fought Hannibal. It was only in
later times that the term dictator came to mean a political ruler wielding absolute
power for an unlimited period of time.
The original idea was reasonable, i.e. that extreme peril demands extreme
measures: the salus populi as the suprema lex was an axiom with which critical
jurists could live. It is noteworthy that even the dictatorships of the 20th century
were defended – at least in the initial stages – by leading lawyers. When in 1933
Hitler, in a formally legal way, came to power, he was seen as the saviour of a
state in peril. The internationally reputed Professor Carl Schmitt (y 1985), author
of an authoritative Verfassungslehre and member of Hitler’s party from April
1933 onwards argued for the ‘legitimacy of the German Revolution’.1 And even
Dr Hans Frank, an early and staunch follower of Hitler and President of the
Academy for German Law, gave lectures in the middle of the war in several
universities on the need for a law-based state for the survival of any civilized
society.2
How was a reasonable Roman institution pushed, step by step and by some
irresistible logic, to its extreme and ghastly consequences? The fateful moves,
which all stemmed from the one fundamental idea of the concentration of all
power in one hand, may be brieﬂy recalled here. By the Enabling Law of March
1933, passed with the majority required by the Weimar Constitution, the
Reichstag surrendered its legislative powers to Hitler’s government for four
years. It was an act of abdication that was thereafter punctually renewed every
four years – dictatorships can be formalistic. When, in August 1934, President
Hindenburg died, no new President of the Republic was elected. Instead, Hitler
became head of state and head of government and Fu¨hrer (leader) of the German
people: the Constitution of Weimar was clearly dead and buried. The army’s oath
of loyalty to the fundamental law was logically replaced by one to the person of
‘the Fu¨hrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler’. The free trade unions
had been dissolved and all political parties, except Hitler’s own, outlawed, which
meant that the Reichstag was composed exclusively of Nazi-party members.
That was the parliament which, by another logical step, passed, in April 1942, a
law that gave the leader the unlimited right to discipline every German – even a
judge – without regard to legal rules and to punish him or her, without respect of
‘the so-called acquired rights’, in every way the Fu¨hrer judged appropriate. Hitler
had proclaimed himself already in 1934 to be des deutschen Volkes oberster
Gerichtsherr, the supreme justiciar of the German people, and in fact the courts
passed sentence in his name. How this dictatorship, which was meant to rescue
the country from political chaos, ended in 1945 in the country’s utter ruin is a tale
that is as tragic as it is well documented.3
2. The inquisition
My second example concerns the rise around AD1200 of the inquisitorial pro-
cedure. Here again the original premises were justiﬁable. Indeed, the new type of
criminal procedure gave the magistrates the power to prosecute suspected
criminals ex ofﬁcio, i.e. on the strength of their public ofﬁce, and to inquire
(inquirere), i.e. to establish the truth, by active and reasoned examination of the
evidence, such as witnesses, material traces and various indications of guilt or
innocence. The new procedure was experimented with in the second half of the
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12th century in both secular and ecclesiastical courts and received its most formal
and doctrinal shape under Pope Innocent III (1198–1218). It replaced the ancient
form of process, which left the initiative of bringing a case to a private plaintiff –
the victim or a relative – who could accuse the suspect (hence ‘accusatorial
procedure’), but at his own peril. The question of guilt or innocence moreover
was then settled by the judicium Dei, the ordeal by combat or by water or ﬁre, the
judge being a passive onlooker who watched the outcome of the ordeal and
passed sentence accordingly.
It was sensibly argued that the Church and society at large were better
defended against abuse and crime by empowering a person in authority to start
proceedings and by putting the question of guilt in the hands of a trained judge,
who actively examined the available evidence in order to reach a reasoned
conclusion. However, the risk of perversion soon became conspicuous, when it
was realized that the suspect’s confession was the regina probationum, the
queen of modes of evidence. It seemed both the most convincing proof of guilt
and the one that made the judge’s task so much easier, especially when con-
ﬂicting witnesses and dubious circumstances led to doubt, soul-searching and
sleepless nights. So the new procedure led to the overvaluation of confession,
and, quite soon – already by the mid 13th century – the next logical but fatal
step was taken, making the use of torture to obtain the desirable confession
legitimate.
It was a perversion because it made the struggle between prosecution and
defence very unequal and meant that people were condemned, not because they
were guilty but because the judge had decided that they were, and tortured them
until they confessed. Nevertheless, torture was practised legally for many cen-
turies and found its most horriﬁc climax in the Inquisitio haereticae pravitatis,
the papal and royal tribunals prosecuting heretics.
The reader may well ask whether society, once it had turned its back on the
ancient ways, had a valuable alternative to the inquisitorial procedure. The
answer is positive, and it was in England under King Henry II that the other path
was taken. I refer, of course, to the nascent common law, where prosecution ex
ofﬁcio was introduced, not by some royal ofﬁcial but by the ‘grand jury’ (a jury
of accusation) and where the verdict on guilt or innocence was given, not by a
single judge, but by a panel of jurors, the ‘petty jury’. The royal judges passed
sentence according to the verdict of 12 lawful men and were not themselves
engaged in the pursuit of the truth of the matter. Consequently, torture was
unknown in English common law, nor was the Inquisition ever introduced there.
Not having known the inquisitorial process of the Continent to begin with, the
common law avoided its extreme logical outcome, confession obtained under
torture. The divergence between continental and English criminal procedure,
which originated in the Middle Ages, persists until our own time.4
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3. The sovereign nation-state
For many centuries the nation-state has dominated the lives of countless citizens.
It was an undeniable success, as it provided a political structure for the nations
that lived in Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. These groups, such
as the gens Anglorum whose history was written by the Venerable Bede (y 735),
were ethnic, cultural and linguistic communities that became uniﬁed kingdoms,
some of which go back a long time; the English, for example, living in one
kingdom by the tenth century. Spain and France followed much later, the former
going back to the beginning of the 16th century, the latter shortly afterwards,
when the duchy of Brittany was, in 1532, annexed by King Francis I. The
German nation-state followed when the Empire was proclaimed in 1871 with the
Prussian king as ﬁrst German emperor.
The medieval kingdoms had accepted the overriding authority of the Roman
emperor – more in theory than in practice – and of the pope – a very real spiritual
supremacy. A forceful successor of St. Peter, like Pope Boniface VIII, did not
hesitate to address the powerful king of France, Philip IV the Fair, as a son who
had to listen to his paternal voice (bull Ausculta ﬁli, ‘listen my son’, of AD1302).
In other words, these nation-states were not sovereign (superior), as they
recognized a higher power (superior auctoritas) above them.
It was in Modern Times, when the medieval Roman–German Empire had
turned into a purely German one and when the Latin Church had broken up and
papal authority was much reduced – as in France – or even discarded altogether –
as in England – that the sovereign nation-state came into its own. An internal
logic was at work here: that nations sought to expand their own statehood was
normal and it could reasonably be expected that those successful and efﬁcient
nation-states would want to shake off any obstacle to the fulﬁlment of their
destiny and ambitions. It may, moreover, be assumed that most Europeans were
happy to live in their own country under their own king. They might, of course,
have violent arguments about the way they were governed and might even, as the
Puritans did in 1649, behead their king, but these were quarrels between Eng-
lishmen, who never questioned the excellence of their own nation-state.
However, the victim of this new situation was European peace. If every
kingdom could expand at will at the expense of its neighbours and even go to war
to further its aims under the motto ‘right or wrong, my country’, endless European
wars were the logical outcome, the absurd result of a reasonable premise.
So what could be done about it? Some enlightened kings and philosophers
conceived bold schemes guaranteeing peace in the republica christiana, but
they proved to be noble pipedreams. A more realistic approach was the con-
clusion of great freely-negotiated peace treaties, which were supposed to
guarantee at last a permanent equilibrium after protracted warfare. The Treaties
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of Westphalia after the Thirty Years War are an outstanding example of this.
However, a few decades later, Louis XIV embarked on an endless series of
hostilities, and the promise – or illusion – of Westphalia was belied by the
overwhelming ambitions of one Sun King, who clearly believed in the primacy
of politics and not of law.
Some people put their trust in international law, a Law of Nations, a doctrine
worked out by some leading jurists of the age and concerned with the relations
between the modern sovereign states. Two of the great names deserve to be
recalled here: Alberico Gentili (y 1608), and Hugo Grotius (y 1645) whose De
Jure Belli ac Pacis was a path-breaking book. There was, however, no supra-
national authority to impose respect of this Law of Nations, and what is the use
of law without law enforcement? There was no European parliament, govern-
ment or law court, consequently the doctrinal ediﬁce of the jurists was doomed to
be a brilliant product of the Schools, admired and taught by Professors in Law
Faculties, but ignored by the warring governments.
If peace treaties and international law were of no avail, perhaps the hegemony
of one mighty country – France or Germany – could procure a European order,
based on conquest and subjection? The Napoleonic wars and the great cata-
clysms of the 20th century showed the inanity of those ambitions. So, after 1945,
the Europeans came at last to their senses and created a European Union, where
the nation-states gave up their unlimited sovereignty and accepted a common
higher authority, the product of free negotiation conducted by democratically
elected national governments and parliaments. Here, ﬁnally, a logical step was
taken that did not lead to absurd consequences.
4. The American Constitution and the Supreme Court
Judicial review of the constitutionality of the laws is a long established feature of
American life. It means that the courts – and particularly the US Supreme Court –
can strike down laws passed by the state or federal parliaments by declaring them
unconstitutional. The original concept, already defended in the early years of the
Republic, was that everyone, even the legislators, had to act according to the
Constitution and that the judges were in the best position to decide whether a
particular piece of legislation was constitutional or not. Indeed, letting the leg-
islators make out this issue for themselves meant that they would be juge et
partie, which was against common reason. Nevertheless, not everybody agreed
in those early years, because judicial review meant giving ultimate control of the
law, not to elected lawmakers but to appointed judges.
However, in 1803, by the famous sentence in Marbury v. Madison, the
Supreme Court declared itself in possession of judicial review. This settled the
controversy and the principle became an undisputed part of American life.5 In the
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course of the 19th century, judicial review was seldom practised and the Court –
except in the Dred Scott case of 1857 – kept out of public controversy.
Things changed in the 20th century when the Court got involved in issues that
were politically sensitive and stirred public debate. In some cases the Supreme
Court took a conservative stance, most notoriously when it resisted – or rather
vainly attempted to resist – President Roosevelt’s New Deal. More often, the Court
was in favour of liberal and progressive ideas and I shall analyse three examples.
First, I mention the Court’s stance in defending the freedom of opinion. If
people went to the Supreme Court because a certain law had curtailed their
constitutional right to free political expression, it was only logical that their case
was heard and the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech (1791) upheld.
Nevertheless, it was only in 1931 that a majority was found in the Supreme Court
to enforce the famous Amendment for the ﬁrst time. During the previous decade
the Court had upheld convictions for speeches against the War, but after 1931 it
steadily expanded its interpretation of the freedom of speech.6 Continuing this
liberal line, the Court recently struck down a California law forbidding the
display of the red ﬂag and even upheld the right of protesters to burn the
American ﬂag as an expression of political opinion.
The following step in this liberal and progressive line, pursued by an intellectual
elite in the Supreme Court, came with the controversial Roe v. Wade case, which
turned the famous law court into a quasi-legislative body. Indeed, in 1973, the
Supreme Court, with a 7 to 2 majority, declared the anti-abortion statutes of the
State of Texas unconstitutional, thus legalizing the interruption of pregnancy
within certain limits. The case came to Washington on appeal from a US District
Court in Texas, Henry Wade being the District Attorney of Dallas County and Jane
Roe an alias for the woman in question. The Supreme Court rested its conclusions
on a constitutional right to privacy emanating from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1866), the relevant text reading as follows: ‘Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’.
In this great contemporary debate and in a charged political climate the Court
took sides with the more liberal approach prevailing in Western societies. It was a
logical step considering the Court’s defence of liberal values, but it was never-
theless a debatable step, since there is no article in the US Constitution or the
Amendments dealing with abortion, so that the Court was pushing its logic to
extremes. Not only is there not a word on abortion in the sacred Text of the
United States, but it is obvious that it could not even have been the intention of
the Founding Fathers to take this liberal stance, as at their time abortion was
universally seen as an abominable sin and a crime. Yet, since the task of the
Court is to check laws against the Constitution, the judges had to ﬁnd a way of
anchoring their decision on the Sacred Text. This they did by a reasoning that
struck many lawyers as far fetched. The Court based its judgment on the concept
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of the woman’s privacy: having a child or not, being her private decision, and the
right to privacy being implied in the notion of Due Process. But here again the
Court came up against the fact that the Constitution says nothing about privacy,
an unknown concept in the 18th century, and consequently hard words were used
about ‘judicial usurpation of American politics’ and ‘judicial imperialism’.7
The next logical step in this liberal judicial activism came with the almost
successful attempt (a vote of 5 to 4) of the Court to outlaw capital punishment. Here
the opinion of the four liberal judges was even more remarkable than in Roe v. Wade
for, whereas there was nothing in the Fundamental Law about abortion, there was an
unequivocal constitutional text accepting the death penalty after a fair trial. How
then could capital punishment be against the Constitution, when the Constitution
itself postulated it? Indeed, the Fifth Amendment (1791) stipulates that no person
shall ‘be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law’. And yet
the Supreme Court made a reasonable and almost successful attempt to rid the
country of the death penalty, which to the progressive mind was a relic of the past
and not in accordance with the evolving standards of decency of modern society.
The anti-death-penalty camp formally based its case on the prohibition of
‘cruel and unusual punishments’ in the Eighth Amendment (1791): if execution
by the electric chair or some other means was a cruel and unusual punishment,
then the death penalty was unconstitutional. The objection that this clearly was
not the original intent of the authors of the Fundamental Law was overcome by
the consideration that 20th-century America could not be ruled by the standards
of the 18th. How binding the ‘original intent’ should be on later generations is a
debate into which we cannot enter here.8
The fact remains that the Court almost declared the death penalty unconstitu-
tional, although the Constitution expressly accepts it, but a liberal victory in this
case would apparently have been a bridge too far, and verging on the absurd.
However, can one seriously accuse of absurdity judges such as Mr Justice Brennan,
who defended the liberal approach in his impressive and lucid 1986 Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr Lecture?9 In order to understand the controversy it is helpful to distin-
guish two different views of the role of the Supreme Court. One is that its task is to
see whether a particular statute is in strictly legal terms compatible with the letter of
the Constitution and the intent of its authors. If that is the case, the attempt to
declare capital punishment unconstitutional may indeed seem absurd. But the other
view sees the Court as the supreme guardian of the fundamental values of the
American Republic in the widest sense and respecting the underlying message of
the Great Text in accordance with contemporary values. In that light, the attempt of
the minority was understandable and defensible.
One is, nevertheless, left with the feeling that leaving this decision on life and
death to one judge was an unacceptable burden. Indeed, four judges were clearly
in favour and four clearly against, so that one judge, Mr Justice Lewis Powell
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after long hesitation, in October 1986 cast his deciding vote for maintaining
capital punishment.
It can, however, be pointed out that in political assemblies it also happens that
a single vote is decisive. One remembers the condemnation of Louis XVI in 1793
and the one decisive vote in the Bundestag that, in 1948, made Konrad Adenauer
chancellor of the German Federal Republic. It is also appropriate to remember
that the Supreme Court enjoys a solid democratic legitimacy, as the judges are
appointed by an elected President and conﬁrmed by elected Senators. Never-
theless there is a real difference between politicians elected for a limited period
and judges appointed for life.
From the preceding it should be clear that power moves from the politicians to
the judges when the latter have the ﬁnal word on such sensitive political issues as
abortion and capital punishment. If this is the consequence of having a written
Constitution and Constitutional Courts, as is nowadays the case in numerous
countries, one wonders if a written Constitution is as desirable as is generally
assumed. Or is an unwritten Fundamental Law without a constitutional court – as
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain – preferable? It is ironic that a few
months before I was writing this article the then British Prime Minister, Gordon
Brown, on 10 June 2009 told the House of Commons: ‘It is for many people
extraordinary that Britain still has a largely unwritten constitution. I personally
favour a written constitution’. He seems to have been the ﬁrst British Prime
Minister ever to express such a sentiment.10
5. Papal supremacy
In our ﬁnal example, the initial impetus again was reasonable and justiﬁed, i.e.
the call in the second half of the 11th century for the libertas ecclesiae. This vast
movement, known as the Gregorian Reform or as the Papal Revolution, was
forcefully led by Pope Gregory VII (1073–85). In his day, the Latin Church was
dominated by kings and feudal magnates, who owned abbeys and churches
(Eigenkirchen) and appointed bishops and parish priests. The German king –
Roman emperor appointed the bishops of Rome, some of whom were German,
and the kings openly sold bishoprics to the highest bidder. The Church wanted to
extricate itself from this servitude and establish its freedom of action in its own
spiritual sphere, deemed to be superior to the secular order. To achieve this aim
and overcome the weight of custom and vested interests, concerted action was
necessary, centrally led and co-ordinated by a charismatic leader. The obvious
choice was the bishop of the Church of Rome, with its great prestige and its
unique position in the Latin world. Indeed, of all the ancient eminent Christian
churches, only Rome belonged to the Western world, as the others – in Africa,
Greece and the Near-East – were in Arab or Byzantine hands.
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The Freedom of the Church meant that popes would no longer be appointed by
the German monarch but elected by a college of cardinals. Also, bishops would
no longer be invested by secular rulers (Investiture Struggle), but elected by a
college of canons and/or appointed by the pope, who assumed spiritual leader-
ship over the whole of Latin Christendom: the Church not only became free and
autonomous but established clerical supremacy over the kingdoms and the laity.
However, as the Church obtained its autonomy in the spiritual sphere, so the
kingdoms became separate and autonomous within their secular ambit: it implied
the separation of state and Church and in the course of time the modern state
would free itself from its ties with Church and religion. Meanwhile the pope
proceeded to impose a centralised government, based on his plenitudo potestatis.
He assumed administrative control over the bishops, became the highest lawgiver
for the whole Latin Church and its highest judge with appeals to the Roman curia
from the simplest local courts, via the rural deans, the archdeacons, bishops and
archbishops, following a strict hierarchical chain of command. The papacy also
built a ﬁscal organisation, which drew money from far away places to Rome and
became a model for the kingdoms.
The medieval apotheosis of this imposing endeavour came in the Holy Year of
1300, when Pope Boniface VIII was acclaimed as a universal leader by pilgrims
coming from as far away as Scotland, Poland and Portugal. The great movement
was supported by theologians and jurists: ecclesiastical law was highly devel-
oped and taught in the Faculties. The underlying idea of universal dominion and
disciplined hierarchy owed much to the example of the ancient Roman Empire
and its law, which was ‘discovered’ in the West around the time of Gregory VII.
It became an indispensable tool for the study of canon law and great papal
lawgivers were learned jurists.
Papal absolutism was, in Modern Times, exacerbated by two events. The
Protestant Reformation launched virulent attacks on the papacy, with the logical
consequence that the Catholic Counter-Reformation at the Council of Trent
(1545–63) reacted by stressing the preponderance of Rome even more: the
Church was conﬁrmed as a papal Church, and there were no more ecumenical
councils until Vatican I (1869–70), which marked another extreme step – this
time as a reaction to the Enlightenment and modern liberalism – by proclaiming
papal infallibility in theological questions. This idea had been mooted ever since
medieval times and was now taken a step further by declaring it a dogma. To
some leading Catholics this was so extreme as to be unacceptable and a schism
ensued, inspired by the priest and professor of Church history J.J.I. von Do¨llinger
(y 1890), who in 1871 was excommunicated by the archbishop of Munich. Yet it
could be argued that declaring a leader with absolute power infallible was a
logical option: why give complete control to someone who is apt to make
mistakes? The late medieval conciliar movement had agreed with the Zeitgeist,
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for parliaments and assemblies of estates ﬂourished all over Europe and the
papalism of the Council of Trent was also in unison with the European trend
towards absolutism. Vatican I on the contrary went against the democratic and
liberal grain of modern Europe.
Already in the Middle Ages voices were raised against papal absolutism.
Kings refused to tolerate Roman interference in their national politics, ordinary
Christian people minded that they took no part in the decision making in their
own Church, and intellectuals such as Marsilius of Padua (y 1343) and John
Wycliff (y 1384) voiced outspoken criticism of the Roman curia. The discontent
came to a head in the 16th century when the Protestant Churches on the Con-
tinent and in England seceded from Rome.
In the previous century, an important attempt had been made to reform the
Church from within. The Conciliar Movement saw the Christian people, repre-
sented in ecumenical councils, as the true universal Church, the Roman curia
being one of its organs, not its master. A series of general councils met, where
hundreds of clerics and laymen from every country gathered, and discussed and
issued legal decrees and statements on doctrine. They asserted their supremacy
and even deposed popes. These councils, where voting took place by nations
(per capita nationum), were an experiment in representative democracy and may
rightly be called the ﬁrst European Parliament. They were milestones not only in
ecclesiastical but also in European history. The council of Pisa was held in 1409.
Konstanz sat from 1414 to 1418. On 19 May 1415 the council condemned Pope
John XXIII, forced him to resign and took the government of the Church into its
own hand. The council of Basel (1431–1437–1449) continued the work of
Konstanz and proclaimed as binding doctrine the superiority of the general
council over the pope (denial of which constituted heresy). In 1439 it dismissed
Pope Eugene IV (who nevertheless continued in ofﬁce till 1449) and elected an
‘anti-pope’, Felix V (who abdicated in 1449). These events marked both the
culmination and the demise of the Conciliar Movement, and the papacy, parti-
cularly under Pius II (1458–64), recovered its previous supremacy.
It was not until the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) that a revival of the
conciliar idea took place, when the bishops’ synod was instituted, a body for
periodic consultation between the pope and delegates from the bishops’ con-
ferences: henceforth the bishops were considered the pope’s ‘colleagues’ and
‘brethren’, not his underlings.
In recent years, however, the curia has followed a conservative course, moving
away from the endeavour of Vatican II. So much so that, at the time of writing
(April 2010), a leading Catholic theology-professor, Dr Hans Ku¨ng, wrote an
open letter to the bishops urging them to convene a Council in order to counter
papal ‘absolutism’ and ‘autocracy’. Clearly, the ancient conﬂict between pope
and council has not been laid to rest. It is, however, obvious that Professor Ku¨ng
102 R. C. Van Caenegem
faces a legal problem because the Codex Iuris Canonici, promulgated in 1983 by
Pope John Paul II, makes it clear that only the pope can convene an ecumenical
council and that he presides over it, controls its deliberations and dictates its
agenda, its decrees being subject to his approval (canon 338). And canon 1372
adds, for good measure, that ‘whoever appeals to an oecumenical council or to the
college of bishops against an act of the Roman pontiff shall be censored and
punished (censura puniatur)’. The Codex leaves no doubt, more generally
speaking, about the pope’s absolute control of the Church. Canon 331 states that he
is the head of the College of Bishops and that on the strength of his ofﬁce he
enjoys ‘the highest, full, immediate and universal ordinary power (potestas), which
he can always fully wield’. Canon 332 speaks of his plena et suprema in Ecclesia
potestas, and canon 333 y 3 adds that ‘there is no appeal or recourse against a
sentence or decree of the Roman Pontiff’. It comes therefore as no surprise to read
in canons 1404 and 1405 that the papal see can be judged by nobody, whilst it is
the Roman Pontiff’s right to judge the secular rulers in spiritual and ecclesiastical
matters. As to the Synod of Bishops (canons 342–48), it is conceived as a means of
contact between the bishops and the pope, whom they are ‘to help with their
advice’. It is moreover made clear that the Synod ‘is directly subjected to the
authority of the Roman Pontiff, who convenes it whenever he ﬁnds it opportune,
determines its agenda and presides over it’ (canon 344).11 A global corporation
led by a single autocratic chief executive ofﬁcer, elected for life and ofﬁcially
declared infallible, would strike most observers as going against every rule of good
governance and bordering on the absurd. The extreme and logical outcome in the
21st century of a movement that started in the 11th? The Church is, however, no
business enterprise but a numinous community of the faithful, and religions have
their own ways and ﬁnality, which should perhaps not be judged by secular
standards. Adhuc sub judice lis est, the debate is still going on.
I hope that the reader who seeks a better understanding of the present-day
constitutions of Church and State will ﬁnd my historical reﬂections helpful and
will agree with Professor Sabino Cassese, a judge in the Corte Costituzionale in
Rome, that ‘history is an indispensable companion of the law’.12
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